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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Miller v. Alabama,' 28 states had homicide sentencing
laws that were, overnight, unconstitutional as applied to juvenile
University of Michigan Law School, Clinical Professor. I would like to thank
Jasmine Davis and Amanda Blau for excellent research assistance. I also appreciate the input
of colleagues across the country who helped me understand their state provisions; any errors
are my own. This Article was written as part of a symposium, Sentencing Reform: The Past,
Present, and Future of Criminal Sentencing, held by the South Carolina Law Review.
1. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment was violated by the mandatory imposition of a life without parole sentence on a
393
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2defendants. Miller found that the Eighth Amendment banned the mandatory
imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile, and, in
considering the individualized sentencing procedure that is constitutionally
required, admonished that the sentence of life without parole for juveniles
should be "uncommon"3 or "rare."4 In the years since Miller, many of these
states have passed new sentencing provisions aimed at addressing the
constitutional violation in Miller. Montgomery v. Louisiana, which found
that Miller created a substantive right and applied Miller retroactively,'
increased the need for state responses. This Article takes a hard look at state
legislation after Miller. States have made a range of choices, but a common
approach is to establish a new sentencing process by which sentencing
courts examine the individual juvenile before the court and have a choice
between life without parole and a different, lesser sentence, often a long
term of years or life with the possibility of parole. In particular, this Article
examines these new laws in light of other Eighth Amendment doctrine-
particularly the case law surrounding the statutory framework for the death
penalty and finds that many of these laws are deficient. While state
legislative responses to Miller have eliminated the automatic imposition of
life without parole on juveniles, they have largely failed to provide for any
guidance or limitations on the sentencer. In other words, it remains to be
seen whether or not states will make life without parole "rare," as the
sentencing laws established in its wake set up systems in which the sentence
of life without parole could certainly be imposed arbitrarily and
inconsistently.
juvenile and that juveniles must have individualized sentencing determinations that consider
the unique qualities of youth if they are facing a life without parole sentence).
2. Joshua Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview 3, SENTENCING
PROJECT (July 1, 2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
Juvenile-Life-Without-Parole.pdf (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016));
Gary Gately, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Miller Retroactivity Issue, JUVENILE JUSTICE
INFO. EXCHANGE (Mar. 23, 2015), http://jjie.org/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-miller-
retroactivity-issue/108497/ (noting that the ruling in Miller affected mandatory sentencing
laws in twenty-eight states and the federal government and suggesting that those states remedy
the unconstitutionality of mandatory juvenile life without parole sentences after Miller by
simply permitting parole hearings for the thousands of juveniles who were sentenced
mandatorily prior to Miller); see also Joshua Rovner, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012
Supreme Court Mandate on Life Without Parole 1, SENTENCING PROJECT (June 25, 2014),
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Slow-to-Act-State-Responses-to-
Miller.pdf (stating that 28 states had laws that were struck down by Miller which provided for
mandatory juvenile life without parole).
3. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
4. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
5. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732-34 (2016).
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First, this Article surveys the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to
analogize life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty for adults, and
discusses the Eighth Amendment law regarding the parameters around death
penalty statutory schemes. Second, this Article examines the state legislative
response to Miller, and scrutinizes it with the Court's Eighth Amendment
death penalty law-and the states' responses to this case law-in mind. This
Article highlights the failure of juvenile homicide sentencing provisions to:
1) narrow offenses that are eligible for life without parole sentences; 2)
further limit, once a guilty finding is made, the categories of offenders to the
most likely to have demonstrated "irreparable corruption,"; and 3) provide
for meaningful appellate review, among other deficiencies.
II. MILLER, MONTGOMERY, AND A BRIEF LOOK AT SOME EIGHTH
AMENDMENT LAW AROUND DEATH PENALTY LEGISLATION
In Graham and Miller, the Court analogized the sentence of life without
6parole for juveniles to the sentence of the death penalty for adults. Life
without parole is the most severe sentence that a juvenile can
constitutionally receive.7 For juveniles, a life without parole sentence
guarantees [the juvenile] will die in prison without any meaningful
opportunity to obtain release, no matter what he might do to
demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not
representative of his true character, even if he spends the next half
century attempting to atone for his crimes and learn from his
mistakes.'
Notably, the Court found that the same concerns that motivated its
invalidation of juvenile death penalty sentences in Roper apply in the life
without parole context:
The juvenile should not be deprived of the opportunity to achieve
maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and
6. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2011) (recognizing that ife without parole
sentences "share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other
sentences"). See also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 69) (stating that
because the Court "viewed [life without the possibility of parole sentence] for juveniles as akin
to the death penalty, we treated it similarly to that most severe punishment").
7. See Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that executing juveniles
violates the Eighth Amendment).
8. Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.
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potential. In Roper, that deprivation resulted from an execution that
brought life to its end. Here, though by a different dynamic, the
same concerns apply. Life in prison without the possibility of parole
gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for
reconciliation with society, no hope.9
In Miller, the Court, in part relying on this analysis, found that the
mandatory imposition of a life without parole sentence on a youth violated
the Eighth Amendment.' 0 The Miller Court also opined that, under the
discretionary system that could remain, the sentence of life without parole
for a juvenile should be "rare" or "uncommon."" In applying Miller
retroactively, the Court in Montgomery stated that most youth convicted of
homicide have a substantive Eighth Amendment right not to be sentenced to
life without parole, and that only youth who are "irreparably corrupt" can be
eligible for a discretionary life without parole sentence.12
In addition to making the comparison between life without parole for
juveniles and the death penalty, in developing these juvenile cases, the Court
has drawn extensively on its death penalty jurisprudence. In its decisions, the
Court has repeatedly cited to the landmark Eighth Amendment death penalty
cases, which suggests that the Court's death penalty cases are relevant for
the discussion of juvenile life without parole under the Eighth Amendment.
Specifically, the Court has cited Lockett,13 Enmund and Tison,14 Atkins,
Kennedy, 1 and Coker.
9. Id.
10. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
11. Id.
12. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2469).
13. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608-09 (1978) (reversing the death sentence
imposed on the petitioner, who was convicted of aggravated murder, after finding that the
Ohio death penalty statute under which the petitioner was sentenced violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments because the statute did not allow for a sentencer to consider any
aspect of a defendant's character, record, or circumstances of the offense that a defendant
proffers as a mitigating factor for a sentence less than death). See also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2463-64 (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608) (providing that the sentencing authority must
"consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him
to death"); Graham, 560 U.S. at 102 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605)
(providing that the Constitution "gives special protection to capital defendants because the
death penalty is a uniquely severe punishment that must be reserved for only those who are
'most deserving of execution').
14. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (remanding for new penalty phase
hearing when there was no finding that petitioners had a major role in the offense and that they
had an intent to kill or a reckless indifference to human life); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
798-801 (1982) (reversing death penalty where petitioner participated in a robbery in the
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Therefore, while prior to Graham it was often said that, in the context of
the Eighth Amendment analysis, "death is different," many have opined that
is no longer true. In his Graham dissent, Justice Thomas warned explicitly
that the Court's decision implied the elimination of the distinction between
death and other sentences: "'Death is different' no longer."" Scholars after
Graham have also suggested that death may no longer be different.' 9
course of which a murder was committed, but did not himself commit the murder or intend or
attempt to take life or use lethal force). See also Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (citing Enmund, 458
U.S. at 799; and Tison, 481 U.S. at 170-71) (providing that defendants who do not kill, intend
to kill, or anticipate that homicide will occur while they are engaged in criminal behavior are
"categorically less deserving of the most serious form of punishment than are murderers");
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 589 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Enmund, 458
U.S. at 801; and Tison, 481 U.S. at 149) (providing that the Constitution requires that
punishment be tailored to both the nature of the crime and the defendant's moral culpability
and responsibility); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 853 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); and Tison, 481 U.S. at
149) (providing that a proportional punishment requires a nexus between the defendant's
culpability and the punishment imposed).
15. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that executions of
developmentally disabled defendants violate the Eighth Amendment). See also Miller, 132 S.
Ct. at 2463 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318) (demonstrating the Court's practice of placing
categorical bans on sentencing practices that foster incongruences between the culpability of
certain classes of offenders as a whole (e.g., mentally handicapped) and the severity of the
penalty (e.g., death)); Graham, 560 U.S. at 48 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318; Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) and Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-89) (concluding that the use
of a categorical approach to regulating sentencing length and severity, as demonstrated in
Atkins and prior cases, was appropriate in the case of juvenile nonhomicide offenders as well).
16. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 446 (holding that the rape of a child did not warrant the
petitioner's death sentence). See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (citing Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 447)
(providing that it is appropriate to categorically ban the imposition of the death penalty on
non-homicide offenders); Graham, 560 U.S. at 60-61 (citing Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 446)
(providing Kennedy as an illustration from a class of cases that used categorical rules to define
Eighth Amendment standards).
17. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1977) (reversing the death sentence of
the petitioner, who was convicted of rape of an adult woman while in the course of an armed
robbery, because the sentence of death for rape does not warrant the taking of the offender's
life who did not take any life himself). See also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (citing Coker, 433
U.S. at 599; Kennedy, 544 U.S. at 446) (noting the Court's rejection of the death penalty for
non-homicide offenders); Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 600) (providing
that the Court has recognized that certain classes of defendants are categorically less deserving
of the most serious forms of punishment, such as non-homicide offenders).
18. Graham, 560 U.S. at 102-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at
319) ("Until today, the Court has based its categorical proportionality rulings on the notion
that the Constitution gives special protection to capital defendants because the death penalty is
a uniquely severe punishment that must be reserved for only those who are 'most deserving of
execution' . . . [t]oday's decision eviscerates that distinction. 'Death is different' no longer.").
19. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still)
Different?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 38 (2013) (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 58-61)
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Regardless of whether the Court broadens Eighth Amendment doctrine
to apply to sentences other than life without parole for juveniles, it certainly
now extends this far. As Justice Breyer noted in his concurring opinion in
Miller, the categorical ban on the imposition of the death penalty for lesser-
involved aiders and abetters translates to the examination of life without
20parole for juveniles, as does the categorical ban on the death penalty for
adults with intellectual disabilities.21 There are many unanswered questions,
22however. This Article focuses on one of these: How will statutes that allow
juveniles to be sentenced to life without parole hold up against the Eighth
Amendment death penalty law regarding the form, content, and review
available under statutory provisions for the most extreme sentence?
A short overview of some particularly relevant pieces of the Supreme
Court's death penalty history is needed before we take a hard look at the
new juvenile sentencing legislation.
In 1972, when the Court found the death penalty unconstitutional in
Furman,23 the Justices were concerned with a range of problems in the
("Graham breached the capital versus non-capital divide . . . Graham essentially imported the
proscription against disproportionate punishment from the Court's capital jurisprudence into its
non-capital jurisprudence and transformed a 'death-is-different' doctrine into a more general
limitation on excessive sentences.").
20. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2475-76 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that because of their
"twice diminished culpability," he viewed the sentence of life without parole, whether
discretionary or mandatory, as violating the Eighth Amendment for a juvenile who did not kill
or intend to kill) (citing, among other cases, Graham, 560 U.S. at 69; Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)). Some states have codified these
exclusions for individuals facing the death penalty, see for example, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.030 (2) (barring the death penalty for individual with an intellectual disability), but
have not done so for juveniles facing life without parole.
21. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (barring death penalty for adults
with intellectual disabilities). See also Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014)
(reaffirming Atkins and further defining intellectual disability).
22. For examples of commentaries after Graham and Miller that examine other Eighth
Amendment implications, see generally Douglas A. Berman, Graham and Miller and The
Eighth Amendment's Uncertain Future, 27 CRIM. JUST. 19 (2013), for a discussion of the
uncertainty in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with the fall of the bright-line "death is
different" rule. See also William W. Berry III, Bombshell or Babystep? The Ramifications of
Miller v. Alabama for Sentencing Law and Juvenile Crime Policy, 78 Mo. L. REV. 1053,
1075-76 (2013) ("As explained above, if juveniles are different in the sense that they are a
unique class of offender, two potential consequences logically follow. First, the limitation on
death sentences as the only relevant punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes dissipates.
Second, if juveniles are different as a class, other classes of offenders may also be different. If
the restriction on punishment scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment no longer applies, then the
doctrinal expansion of the cruel and unusual punishment clause with respect to juveniles could
go much further than juvenile LWOP cases.").
23. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
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application of the death penalty, including the possibility that it was "so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed"24 instead of imposed for only the worst
25
offenders and that the lack of procedures permitted discriminatory
application of the death penalty.26 States responded by enacting a variety of
new death penalty statutes. Some states passed legislation providing for a
mandatory death penalty; these were struck down by the Court because they
failed to give particularized consideration to an individual defendant and
failed to "fulfill Furman's basic requirement [to] replac[e] arbitrary and
wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and
make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." 27
24. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. Id. (comparing the application of the death penalty to an individual's chance of
being struck by lightning). See also Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death
Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1283, 1283 (1997) ("[Furman] was
based in part on the Justices' belief that relatively few (15-20%) of the number of death-
eligible murderers were being sentenced to death and that there was no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the cases in which the death penalty was imposed. In subsequent cases, the
Court interpreted Furman to require that the states, by statute, genuinely narrow the death-
eligible class."); Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941, 951-52 (1986) ("[T]he death
penalty can be imposed only if the sentencer's discretion is adequately limited and
guided ... [because] there is a greater need for reliability in capital sentencing procedures than
in noncapital sentencing procedures, both to minimize the risk of error and to avoid
arbitrariness, caprice, and discrimination; the choice to sentence someone to die must be based
on reason, not caprice or emotion; and the state in its sentencing scheme must provide a
rational and meaningful basis for the sentencer to use in singling out the few who are to die
from among the many who are allowed to live.").
26. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) ("Furman mandates that where
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so
as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."); Furman, 408 U.S. at 255
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("Those who wrote the Eighth Amendment knew what price their
forebears had paid for a system based, not on equal justice, but on discrimination. In those
days the target was not the blacks or the poor, but the dissenters ... One cannot read this
history without realizing that the desire for equality was reflected in the ban against 'cruel and
unusual punishments' contained in the Eighth Amendment."). See also Betty B. Fletcher, The
Death Penalty in America: Can Justice Be Done?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 813-18 (1995)
(discussing the evolution of the death penalty in America, and citing reasons for the drop in
executions prior to Furman as including the rise in habeas corpus petitions for state prisoners
and Civil Rights Movement leaders' growing concerns that the death penalty could be easily
applied in a racially discriminatory fashion by juries); Rory K. Little, The Federal Death
Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 347, 369-72 (1999) (noting that although federal executions in the pre-Furman
twentieth century were "relatively infrequent," a growing concern mounted that the "absolute
and unguided discretion granted to federal juries" in capital punishment cases would follow
discriminatory patterns).
27. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
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Other states, like Georgia, responded by passing legislation that provided a
series of aggravating circumstances, at least one of which had to be found
beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant could be considered for the
21death penalty by the jury. In approving this legislation, the Court
determined that the sentencer's "discretion to be exercised is controlled by
clear and objective standards so as to produce non-discriminatory
application." 29 The Court also approved other state legislation that, in other
ways, "narrow[ed] the categories of murders for which a death sentence may
ever be imposed" 30 and provided "capital sentencing procedure guides and
focuses the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances
of the individual offense and the individual offender before it can impose a
sentence of death." 3' Another key element of these approved capital
punishment schemes was the provision for automatic review by an appellate
32
court, often the highest state court, which would not otherwise review the
case.33 The Court noted that state supreme court review for proportionality
"is intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the penalty." 34
Subsequent to Gregg, the Court has, as the Court reiterated in Graham,
determined that certain categories of offenders and certain categories of
offenses are not eligible to receive the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment. 35  As summarized by one scholar, "death penalty
28. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-65 (citing GA. CODE ANN § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975)
(current version at GA. CODE ANN § 17-10-30 (2012)) ("Before a convicted defendant may be
sentenced to death, however, except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, the jury, or the
trial judge in cases tried without a jury, must find beyond a reasonable doubt one of the 10
aggravating circumstances specified in the statute.").
29. Id. at 198 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).
30. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270 (1976).
31. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274. Cf Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amendment:
Arbitrariness, Juries, and Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REV. 771, 777 (2005)
(quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189) ("Gregg, through its reincarnation of Furman, then, could
claim, 'Furman mandates ... that discretion [in a capital case] must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.' With these words,
a system of risk-management was born. Yet, neither 'sentencing procedures' nor 'risks' had
been a part of Furman's mandate.").
32. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 ("By providing prompt judicial review of the jury's decision
in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded,
rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under law.").
33. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166-67 (noting "special expedited direct review by the Supreme
Court of Georgia of the appropriateness of imposing the sentence of death," including relative
proportionality).
34. Id. at 203.
35. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413, 439 (2008) (barring capital
punishment for rape of a child or other offense that does not result in death of the victim);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (barring the death penalty for defendants under
the age of 18); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring capital punishment for
400
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proportionality jurisprudence teaches that in order for the penalty of death to
be reserved for 'the worst of the worst,' its application should be narrowly
and categorically drawn in terms of both offenders and offenses."3 6
III. FAILURE OF POST-MILLER LEGISLATION TO NARROW THE YOUTH
SUBJECT TO LWOP AND PROVIDE MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW
If we take the comparison to the death penalty seriously, the post-Miller
statutes do not fare well. This Article first surveys the legislative responses
that the states have made to Miller. Then, it looks at these statutes in an
Eighth Amendment framework that has been used in death penalty cases.
This framework reveals that, first, the statutes largely ignore the post-
Furman work that the Court has done to categorically eliminate the most
severe punishment for groups of offenders or offenses. Second, the statutes
do not give contour to the types of offenses or offenders that the state
considers more likely to demonstrate "irreparable corruption"'7 or be the
"worst of the worst." 38 Finally, I did not find any state statute that explicitly
privileged appellate review for youth who receive a life without parole
statute, despite the widespread practice of additional appellate review for
proportionality across cases and sufficiency of aggravation in death penalty
jurisdictions.
intellectually disabled); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (barring the death
penalty from being inflicted upon a prisoner who is insane); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (barring capital punishment for rape of adult).
36. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now the Twain Should
Meet, 46 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 29, 46 (2013) (looking generally to the proportionality analysis
in death penalty cases and drawing lessons for juvenile transfer laws).
37. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (quoting Roper, 546 U.S. at 573);
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) ("Miller did bar life without parole,
however, for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent
incorrigibility ... Miller drew a line between children whose crimes reflect transient
immaturity and those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption. The fact that
life without parole could be a proportionate sentence for the latter kind of juvenile offender
does not mean that all other children imprisoned under a disproportionate sentence have not
suffered the deprivation of a substantive right.").
38. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319) ("Capital
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a narrow category of the most
serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of
execution."').
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A. Summary of Statutory Changes
In the years since Miller, some, but not all, of the states that had
mandatory juvenile life without parole sentencing laws have passed
legislative revisions.3 9 In fact, some have been critical of the relatively slow
pace of passage of new legislation.40
While this Article focuses on post-Miller legislation, it is worth noting
that in most states where the legislature has not acted, the state courts have
crafted a temporary (or perhaps not so temporary) remedy for the
unconstitutional statute.41
Also removed from consideration are the states that, either before or
after Miller, have eliminated the sentence of life without parole entirely for
juvenile defendants. Before Miller, at least five states had eliminated the
42
sentence of life without parole for children. After Miller, a number of other
states have followed suit, at least for new cases, including Colorado
(2016);43 South Dakota (2016);44 Utah (2016);45 Iowa (2016);46 Connecticut
(2015);47 Nevada (2015) ;48 Vermont (2015) ;49 Hawaii (2014);50 West
39. See Rovner, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that although Miller struck down laws in
twenty-eight states, only thirteen states had enacted revised statutes).
40. Id.
41. For an example of this approach, see Minnesota's State v. Ali, in which the court
vacated the mandatory LWOP sentence for the juvenile and remanded to the sentencing court
for a Miller hearing at which the choice was between life without parole and life with
consideration for release after 30 years, under MINN. STAT. § 609.185a. See State v. Ali, 855
N.W.2d 235, 256 (Minn. 2014) (also noting that there is no legislation resolving the Miller
problem with its existing statute mandating life without parole for first-degree premeditated
murder, MINN. STAT. § 609.106). Another example is Jackson v. State, 883 N.W.2d 272, 274-
75 (Minn. 2016) (finding a mandatory life without parole sentence unconstitutional under
Montgomery and remanding with instructions to sentence to life with parole review after 30
years).
42. These states include Alaska (ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.125 (West 2016));
Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-104(IV) (2016)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-6618) (2012)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.040(1) (2016)); and Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-222(1) (2015); 45-5-102(2) (2015)).
43. S.B. 16-180, 70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016); S.B. 16-181, 70th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2016). See also CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENTENCING OF
YOUTH, Colorado Eliminates Life Without Parole (June 16, 2016),
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/2016/06/16/colorado-eliminates-life-without-parole/
(describing the Colorado bills which eliminated the practice of sentencing children to life in
prison without the possibility of parole).
44. S.B. 140, 91st Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2016).
45. H.B. 405, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016).
46. State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016).
47. S.B. 796, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2015).
48. A.B. 267, 78th Reg. Sess. § 2 (Nev. 2015).
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Virginia (2014);51 Massachusetts (2013);52 Texas (2013);53 Wyoming
(2013).54 As of the fall of 2016, seventeen states have banned life without
55
parole and four have banned it in nearly all cases.
A few scholars after Miller have suggested the direction that legislation
should take56 and have noted the difficulty of legislative compliance with
Miller, but there is little guidance for states. Of the states that have passed
legislation that still permits life without parole, by far the most common
approach has been to change the sentencing hearing itself, instead of, for
example, the parole board process.
B. Issue 1: Broader Category of Offenses Eligible for JLWOP
Under the post-Miller statutes, youth are eligible for life without parole
in greater numbers than adults are eligible for the death penalty in two
categorical ways.
First, if one takes the comparison seriously, the offenses for which
juveniles are eligible to receive the sentence of life without parole should not
be broader than the offenses for which adults can receive the most serious
penalty in that jurisdiction. In other words, given the history of death penalty
law and the Court's comparison, it would stand to reason that states would
unify the offenses for which adults could receive the death penalty and
offenses for which juveniles could receive life without parole. For example,
in a death penalty jurisdiction that limits the death penalty to first-degree
murder (however defined) but excludes death as a possible punishment for
second-degree murder (however defined), life without parole should not be
an eligible sentence for second-degree murder.
49. H.B. 62, 2015-16 Leg. Sess. § 7045 (Vt. 2015).
50. H.B. 2116, 27th Leg. Sess. (Haw. 2014).
51. H.B. 4210, 81st Leg., 2d Sess. (W.Va. 2014).
52. Diatchenko v. Dist. Att'y, 1 N.E.3d 270, 282 (Mass. 2013).
53. S.B. 2, 83rd Leg., Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
54. H.B. 23, 62nd Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013).
55. CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS 4, 6 (Sept.
2016), http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/righting-wrongs-the-five-year-groundswell-of-state-
bans-on-life-without-parole-for-children/.
56. See, e.g., Lauren Kinell, Answering the Unanswered Questions: How States Can
Comport with Miller v. Alabama, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 143, 149-58 (2013) (examining
early approaches to Miller legislative compliance); Sonia Mardarewich, Note, Certainty in a
World of Uncertainty: Proposing Statutory Guidance to Sentencing Juveniles to Life Without
Parole, 16 THE SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REV. ON RACE & Soc. JUSTICE 123, 124 (2013)
(suggesting a "framework to consult in drafting legislation that eliminates mandatory life
without parole for juvenile offenders convicted on a transferred intent theory").
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That logic, however, has not taken hold across the board. An example of
a state that has not followed this prescription is Louisiana. In Louisiana, only
first-degree murder is eligible for the death penalty, 7 while juveniles serving
both first and second-degree murder both receive new sentencing hearings at
which LWOP is a possible sentence." First-degree murder requires "specific
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm," and an additional aggravating
circumstance, such as the victim was a law enforcement officer, the killing
was done to prevent testimony, the victim was under 12 years old or over 65
years old, etc. 59 By contrast, second-degree murder includes offenses in
which there is a "specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm" but
without an additional aggravating factor, as well as felony murder and other
killings that do not require a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily
60harm. South Dakota, which passed its Miller legislation in 2013, then
61
subsequently banned life without parole, was another example.
One state that has limited the category of offenses for which youth could
receive life without parole is North Carolina. North Carolina's juvenile
murder sentencing statute does this by limiting the category of otherwise
eligible convictions that may proceed to a life without parole hearing. In
North Carolina, even if a youth is duly convicted of first-degree murder, the
post-Miller sentencing statute excludes youth convicted under a felony
62
murder theory from eligibility for life without parole.
Arkansas is an example of a state that unifies the statutory offense
eligibility for the most extreme penalty available for the death penalty (for
63
adults) and for life without parole (for children). Arkansas amended its
57. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(C)(1) (2016) (noting the ability of a prosecutor to
seek a capital verdict).
58. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 878.1(A) (2016); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:574.4(E) (2012).
59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(A) (defining first-degree murder).
60. Id. § 14:30.1 (2016) (defining second-degree murder).
61. The legislation made both Class A and Class B felonies eligible for life without
parole sentences for juveniles. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1 (2016). In contrast, only
individuals convicted of Class A felonies, and who were not juveniles at the time of
commission of the offense, are eligible for the death penalty. Id. The legislature banned life
without parole in 2016. S.B. 140, 91st Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2016).
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.19B(a)(1) (2015) ("If the sole basis for
conviction of a count or each count of first degree murder was the felony murder rule, then the
court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment with parole.").
63. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (2008) provides:
(b) A defendant convicted of capital murder, § 5-10-101, or treason, § 5-51-201, shall be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole in accordance with §§ 5-4-60-5-4-605,
5-4-607, and 5-4-608, except if the defendant was younger than eighteen (18) years of age at
the time he or she committed the capital murder he or she shall be sentenced to:
(1) Life imprisonment without parole under § 5-4-606; or
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mandatory life without parole statute to allow for the choice between life
without parole and life with parole after a minimum of 28 years if the
64defendant was under 18 at the time of the capital murder.
C. Issue 2: No Narrowing of the Categories ofIndividuals or Qualities
of the Statutory Offenses that are Subject to the Possibility of Life
Without Parole
In death penalty law, the statutory framework which requires finding at
least one aggravating factor, and to weigh any mitigating evidence against
65the aggravating circumstance(s), is well-established. As mentioned earlier,
the Court looked to these statutory frameworks as a means to focus the
sentence on "clear and objective standards so as to produce non-
discriminatory application"66 and to limit the possible imposition of the
death penalty on the "worst of the worst."6 7 Although there has been a robust
critique of how well aggravating circumstances-or other death penalty
61
schemes for that matter-constrain eligibility and provide clear guidance,
aggravating circumstances must, at a minimum, be defined well enough "to
furnish principled guidance for the choice between death and a lesser
penalty." 69
Aggravating circumstances or other ways to narrow the category of
death-eligible individuals may constrain or focus in at least two relevant
(2) Life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving a minimum of twenty-
eight (28) years' imprisonment.
See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(1)(A) (2008) (defining capital murder to
include felony murder, premeditated murder, murder for hire, and other circumstances); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(c) (providing the same sentencing for Class Y felonies and second-
degree murder, without respect to age).
64. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b).
65. Michael Vitiello, The Expanding Use of Genetic and Psychological Evidence:
Finding Coherence in the Criminal Law?, 14 NEV. L.J. 897, 903 (2014) (noting that "this
balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors is so well established in the law").
66. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d
612, 615 (1974)).
67. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-70 (2005) (stating capital punishment
must be limited to a narrow category of offenders and the definition aggravating circumstances
must be narrow and precise); Vitiello, supra note 65, at 902 (noting aggravating and mitigating
circumstances are balanced in determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to the
death penalty).
68. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 25, at 945 (critiquing how courts have refused to
impose any meaningful restrictions on the scope of the "especially heinous" aggravating
circumstance despite the constitutional problems within it).
69. Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 46 (1992) (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486
U.S. 356, 361-64 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-33 (1980)).
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ways. 70 First, prosecutors, in charging, know that they will have to allege
and prove the required factor(s).7 ' From a pool of all death-eligible statutory
offenses, this is likely to further limit those in which the government actually
seeks the death penalty. Second, as the Court recognizes in Gregg and Jurek,
the additional requirements serve to focus the sentencer's attention on
additional features of the case or offender that must be considered in
addition to the facts needed for a conviction-and, effectively, narrow the
72
number of individuals who are considered for the death penalty.
This system could be a fit for starting to narrow the number of possible
JLWOP cases, in which the Court has now told us that, of the youth who
have committed homicides that can statutorily be punished with LWOP,
only the smaller subset of youth who are "irreparab[ly] corrupt" can be
eligible for a LWOP sentence.73
While the Court looked to the establishment of required proof of
additional aggravating circumstances as a way to comply with the Eighth
Amendment in capital punishment cases, states have largely not followed
suit or adopted other narrowing provisions in their JLWOP statutes. For
example, in Arkansas, like many other death penalty states, once an adult
defendant is found guilty of capital murder, state law lays out a separate
sentencing procedure.74 As part of this sentencing, the prosecution must
70. See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97 (recognizing that Georgia "narrowed the
class of murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying 10 statutory aggravating
circumstances, one of which must be found by the jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt
before a death sentence can ever be imposed"); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 262-63 (1976)
("Texas' action in narrowing capital offenses to five categories in essence requires the jury to
find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance before the death penalty may be
imposed, thus requiring the sentencing authority to focus on the particularized nature of the
crime.").
71. See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 (noting that at each of the discretionary stages
from charging to post-sentencing, including the state prosecutor's "unfettered authority" to
select whom he wishes to prosecute for capital offenses, "an actor in the criminal justice
system makes a decision which may remove a defendant from consideration as a candidate for
the death penalty").
72. See supra text accompanying note 68; see also Robert F. Schopp, Reconciling
"Irreconcilable" Capital Punishment Doctrine as Comparative and Noncomparative Justice,
53 FLA. L. REv. 475, 482 (2001) (stating that laws "that narrow the set of death-eligible
offenders . . . serve to reduce the number of death-eligible offenders in a manner that justifies
the more severe punishment of those selected").
73. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726 (2016) (quoting Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012)).
74. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (2016) (laying out additional trial procedural
requirements for defendants found guilty of capital murder); cf ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b)
(2016) (permitting life with and life without parole for juveniles, but not providing for, nor
making any references to, other statutes that provide for a sentencing process in which this is
to occur).
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prove at least one aggravating circumstance.75  Arkansas' statutory
amendments addressing Miller only changed the available sentences after
conviction.7 Under its now-defunct post-Miller statute, South Dakota
provided for a "presentence hearing," as in death penalty cases, but there
were no required aggravated findings and no other constraints or guidance
for the sentence,77 unlike under its death penalty provisions.78 Although there
are other grounds on which it could be critiqued, one state that did model its
JLWOP statute after a death penalty statute is Missouri. 79 Missouri's law,
passed in July 2016, has a list of aggravating factors, one or more of which
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. 0
Aggravating circumstances or other objective-narrowing provisions can
also serve to assist in reviewing the imposition of the most severe penalty.
Finally, after the imposition of the death penalty, legislatures provided that
the sufficiency of these narrowing circumstances are a specific subject of
appellate review. In Pennsylvania, for example, the state supreme court is
specifically told that one reason that it should not affirm a death sentence is
if "the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating
75. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (2016) (listing 10 categories of aggravating
circumstances, including that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and that the
murder was committed to escape from custody); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (2016)
(describing circumstances in which the jury shall impose a death sentence and circumstances
in which the jury shall impose a sentence of life without parole).
76. See H.B. 1993, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (amending provisions of
capital murder sentencing in response to Miller).
77. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-1 (2015).
78. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (2015) (listing 10 aggravating circumstances,
such as commission for money or commission during an escape, among other circumstances);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-3 (2015) (providing that a jury is to determine the existence
of aggravating circumstances); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (2015) (requiring a jury
finding of at least one aggravating circumstance and jury recommendation for death in order
for death to be imposed); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-5 (2015) (requiring a jury to write
down aggravating circumstance(s) that it found beyond a reasonable doubt); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-27A-6 (2015) (requiring finding by judge of at least one aggravating
circumstance in bench cases before death penalty may be imposed).
79. See, e.g., S.B. 590, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016) (repealing the
mandatory life sentence without parole for juveniles found to be unconstitutional in Miller and
making it discretionary); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.033 (2016) (listing available sentences and
factors to consider in first-degree murder cases against defendants who were under the age of
eighteen at the time of the offense); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.034 (2016) (requiring notice of
intent to file for life without parole for a defendant under the age of eighteen at the time of the
offense).
80. S.B. 590, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.034
(2016).
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circumstance."8 ' If the court finds the aggravating evidence insufficient, it is
directed to remand for imposition of a life without parole sentence.82
D. Issue 3: Special Rules for Appellate Review
As mentioned above, after Furman a number of states established
different appellate rules for death penalty cases.8 3 As one scholar noted,
modem death penalty doctrine "has emphasized the importance of appellate
review. While the Court has not imposed a generally applicable standard of
review in capital cases, it has suggested that some form of meaningful
review is required." 84  While the Court has not required rigorous
proportionality provisions in capital cases and scholars have criticized the
effectiveness of these provisions, a variety of appellate review provisions
81. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(3)(ii) (West 2016).
82. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(4) (West 2016).
83. Penny J. White, Can Lightning Strike Twice? Obligations of State Courts After
Pulley v. Harris, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 813, 825-26 (1999) ("The three statutes at issue in
Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, and Jurek v. Texas were illustrative of the states'
methods of appellate review adopted after Furman. All states allowed appellate review of
death sentences, and the majority of the states followed Georgia in statutorily requiring their
appellate courts to conduct comparative proportionality reviews."); Note, A Matter ofLife and
Death: Due Process Protection in Capital Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 891
(1981) (analyzing the alternative of offering executive clemency to prisoners on death row
who have exhausted appellate review).
84. Steven Semeraro, Responsibility in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79,
120(2002).
85. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-44, 50-51 (1984) (rejecting the
contention that the Eighth Amendment invariably requires comparative proportionality
review whether the punishment is excessive compared to other similar cases-on appeal
before affirming a death sentence). Even though comparative proportionality review is not
constitutionally required in the death penalty context, given the Court's admonition that
JLWOP sentences should be "rare," "uncommon," and reserved for only the few who
demonstrate "irreparable corruption," comparative proportionality review seems particularly
apt. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (quoting Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012)).
86. For an assessment of comparative proportionality review, see, for example, Donald
H. Wallace & Jonathon R. Sorensen, Missouri Proportionality Review: An Assessment of a
State Supreme Court's Procedures in Capital Cases, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 281, 313 (1994), reviewing Missouri's proportionality review process and concluding
that its "enfeebled" process renders a review that "does little more than allow the reviewing
court to justify a death sentence." See also Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Proportionality
Review and the Death Penalty, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 257, 257 (2008) (evaluating the comparative
proportionality review of death sentences with a focus on Washington state); White, supra
note 83, at 868-69 (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR Ass'N
1998)) (discussing the benefits of comparative proportionality review); Leigh B. Bienen, The
Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only "The
408
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have attempted to allow greater access to state courts and also required state
courts reviewing death penalty to give particular consideration to these
87
cases.
As an initial matter, statutes should require the sentencer to provide
reasons for the imposition of sentence. Gregg, in the death penalty context,
noted the importance of when "the sentencing authority is required to
specify the factors it relied upon in reaching its decision" for "meaningful
appellate review." Not all JLWOP statutes explicitly provide for a
statement of reasons by the sentencer; and of those that do,8 9 there will
inevitably be debate about whether the requirement is sufficiently robust to
provide for appellate review.
Another way that legislatures sought to ensure that the imposition of the
death penalty was given sufficient scrutiny was by giving automatic review
in the state's highest court to these cases, instead of requiring these cases to
go through a certiorari or request for leave process. For example,
Pennsylvania provides that "[a] sentence of death shall be subject to
automatic review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to its
rules." 90
Appearance ofJustice", 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 141-46 (1996) (comparing two
different approaches to proportionality review: the analysis of a capital case system and the
review of a single death sentence); Rhonda G. Hartman, Critiquing Pennsylvania's
Comparative Proportionality Review in Capital Cases, 52 U. PITT L. REv. 871, 872 (1991)
(critiquing Pennsylvania's appellate review process in capital cases and proposing
methodologies for establishing an effective comparative proportionality review procedure that
is consistent with the principles of fairness and uniformity). In another study, Wallace and
Sorensen looked at fifty-five cases from twelve jurisdictions from 1975 through April 1996 in
which comparative proportionality review had been done. Donald H. Wallace & Jonathon R.
Sorensen, Comparative Proportionality Review: A Nationwide Examination ofReversed Death
Sentences, 22 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 13, 20-21 (1997). They found that Florida led these
jurisdictions in comparative review reversals (26), followed by North Carolina (7), Illinois (4),
Idaho and Nevada (3), Arkansas, Louisiana, and Georgia (2), and Arizona, Mississippi,
Missouri, and Oklahoma (1). Id. at 27-34.
87. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 917(h)(1) (West 2016) (providing for
automatic review of death sentences by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania); Semeraro, supra
note 84, at 120 ("The Court has rejected simplistic devices that might enable an appellate court
to affirm death sentences without taking sufficient responsibility for the result.").
88. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
89. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.25 (2014); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 769.25a (2014).
90. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(1) (2014); see also TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-206(a)(1) (2016) (providing for automatic review by the state court of criminal
appeals and, if the sentence is affirmed, by the state supreme court); cf Joseph E. Wilhelm &
Kelly L. Culshaw, Ohio's Death Penalty Statute: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 63 OHIO
ST. L.J. 549, 584 (2002) (noting that although Ohio's penal code calls for mandatory appellate
review of death sentences (section 2929.05(A) of the Ohio Revised Code), "[t]he [U.S.
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In addition to providing increased access to state appellate courts, a
number of death penalty statutes also seek to give increased substantive
review to cases in which the death penalty is imposed, especially along
dimensions that might give rise to constitutional error. For example, in
Pennsylvania, the state supreme court is told to affirm death sentences
"unless it determines that: (i) the sentence of death was the product of
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor." 9' As another example, in
South Dakota, the state supreme court must examine each death sentence to
determine whether it was imposed "under the influence of passion or
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor," whether there is sufficient evidence
for the aggravating circumstance(s), and whether the sentence is
92disproportionate to the penalty imposed in other cases. As a third example,
Arkansas' Supreme Court examines the evidence supporting the aggravating
circumstances and conducts a harmless error analysis in some cases.93
Although it was never adopted, the federal Fairness in Death Sentencing
Act,94 which provided that a defendant could challenge that his death
sentence was the result of racial bias, gives one possible example for how
substantive review specifically for racial discrimination in sentencing might
95
occur.
At the time of this writing, I could not find one post-Miller statute that
provided additional access to appellate courts for individuals sentenced to
life without parole or enhanced substantive review for proportionality,
discriminatory implementation, or other aspects.
Supreme] Court has not mandated, however, that state appellate courts independently weigh
selection factors as part of appellate review of a death sentence. Indeed, the Court does not
even require reweighing by state appellate courts to correct constitutional weighing errors
made by the original sentencer").
91. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(3)(i) (2014).
92. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-12 (2016) ("Factors reviewed by Supreme Court
regarding sentence. With regard to the sentence, the Supreme Court shall determine: (1)
[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary factor; and (2) [w]hether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a
statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in § 23A-27A-1; and (3) [w]hether the
sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.").
93. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(d) & (e) (2016).
94. H.R. 2851, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
95. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.300 (2016) (known as the Racial Justice Act,
which allows for a pretrial claim that race was a "significant factor" in the decision to seek
death); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal Justice, 39 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 233, 241-45 (2007) (describing the Kentucky Racial Justice Act and its
potential influence on prosecutorial behavior); see also Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The
Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina,
88 N.C. L. REv. 2031 (2010) (discussing North Carolina Racial Justice Act).
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E. Issue 4: No Limit on the Scope or Subject Area of Aggravating
Evidence or Rules Regarding What Evidence Can Be Presented at
the Miller Hearing, and How the Hearing Should Be Conducted
While it may not be an Eighth Amendment violation, it is worth noting
that the JLWOP statutes, for the most part, lack any codification of the type
or reliability of evidence that will be presented and used as aggravation at
sentencings in which the government is seeking to impose a life without
parole sentence. The Gregg Court noted that the Eighth Amendment was not
violated by the Georgia statute's allowance of "wide scope of evidence" and
96
argument at death penalty hearings. There are, to be sure, specific
instances or categories of evidence that have been deemed constitutionally
* * *97impermissible.
Nevertheless, a number of capital punishment statutes cabin the
evidence that may be presented by the state. For example, the Pennsylvania
death penalty sentencing statute states that "[e]vidence of aggravating
circumstances shall be limited to those circumstances specified in subsection
(d)."98
One state that illustrates the contrast is Arkansas. The Arkansas death
penalty procedure statute gives guidance as to what evidence may be placed
before the sentencer, that evidence regarding aggravating circumstances
must conform to the rules of evidence at trial and the format for
argumentation.99 By contrast, in Arkansas, the statutory amendments
addressing sentencing post-Miller do not provide any guidance about how
the hearing should be conducted or what is relevant, or irrelevant,
evidence.100
In terms of other evidence, a number of states have, in their legislation,
codified the "Miller factors" or a series of factors similar to those listed in
Miller. 0" Some of the state legislation explicitly characterizes these factors
96. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203 (1976).
97. See, e.g., Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 159 (1992) (finding, where there was
no relevance to the offense, a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment to introduce
evidence of Aryan Brotherhood membership in the sentencing phase).
98. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(2) (2014).
99. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(4) (2016) (providing, among other things, that
admission of "evidence relevant to an aggravating circumstance" is governed by the rules of
evidence). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(5) (2016) (addressing the order of
argumentation of the parties).
100. See H.B. 1993, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (amending provisions of capital murder
sentencing in response to Miller).
101. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.25 (West 2014) (listing factors, largely
taken directly from Miller, to be considered at the sentencing hearing). These states have not
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as mitigating evidence, which signals their intended use to the sentence.102
For example, North Carolina's legislation characterizes the "mitigating
circumstances" that the defense may submit, lists eight factors that resemble
the Miller factors, then lists "(9) [a]ny other mitigating factor or
circumstance."1 03 Some other states codify the Miller factors as a list of
relevant considerations for the sentencer, but do not explicitly state that the
sentencer is constrained from using one or more of these factors in
aggravation of the sentence.1 04
IV. CONCLUSION
The Miller/Montgomery Court directed that the sentence of life without
parole should be "rare", and only those youth who have demonstrated
"irreparable corruption" are eligible under the Eighth Amendment for an
individualized sentence of LWOP. It remains to be seen how states will
implement this dictate. A look at the state legislation passed post-Miller
suggests, when viewed against a backdrop of Eighth Amendment capital
punishment law, that many of these statutes make a broader group of
offenses eligible for LWOP for youth than for the death penalty for adults.
Further, the legislation does not narrow the categories of youth eligible for
LWOP or provide clear or objective limitations to reduce the potential for
arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of LWOP, and does not provide for
heightened appellate review or privileged access to appellate courts for
youth sentenced to life without parole. These questions are not just
academic-they are beginning to percolate in state courts. For example, in
Pennsylvania, the state supreme court agreed to allow an appeal where the
Petitioner challenged the lack of procedural mechanism which would ensure
explicitly referred to the Eighth Amendment requirement that the sentencer in death penalty
cases be permitted to consider wide-ranging mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978).
102. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-105 (2015) (the court "shall consider the
following additional factors in mitigation") (emphasis added); WASH. REV. CODE
§10.95.030(3)(b) (providing that, in "setting the minimum term, the court must take into
account mitigating factors ... ").
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.19B(c) (West 2015) (the other eight factors are:
"(1) [a]ge at the time of the offense; (2) [i]mmaturity; (3) [a]bility to appreciate the risks and
consequences of the conduct; (4) [i]ntellectual capacity; (5) [p]rior record; (6) [m]ental health;
(7) [fjamilial or peer pressure exerted upon the defendant; (8) [1]ikelihood that the defendant
would benefit from rehabilitation in confinement").
104. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.25.7 (West 2014) ("[T]he court shall specify
on the record the aggravating and mitigation circumstances considered by the court and the
court's reasons supporting the sentence imposed. The court may consider evidence presented
at trial together with any evidence presented at the evidence hearing.").
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that life without parole will be "uncommon." 0 5 The failure to learn lessons
from the Eighth Amendment law on capital punishments poses a risk that the
imposition of the sentence of LWOP on youth could be both random and not
rare.
105. See Commonwealth v. Batts, Order Granting Allowance of Appeal, No. 941 MAL
2015 (Pa., Apr. 19, 2016).
*
